This paper focuses on the evolution of the institutional presidency -meaning the cluster of agencies that directly support the chief of the executive -in Argentina and Brazil since their redemocratization in the 1980s. It investigates what explains the changes that have come about regarding the size of the institutional presidency and the types of agency that form it. Following the specialized literature, we argue that the growth of the institutional presidency is connected to developments occurring in the larger political system -that is, to the political challenges that the various presidents of the two countries have faced. Presidents adjust the format and mandate of the different agencies under their authority so as to better manage their relations with the political environment. In particular, we argue that the type of government (coalition or single-party) has had consequences for the structure of the presidency or, in other words, that different cabinet structures pose different challenges to presidents. This factor has not played a significant role in presidency-related studies until now, which have hitherto mostly been based on the case of the United States.
Introduction
Presidents are undoubtedly the most powerful political actors in Latin American democracies. They enjoy significant policy-making powers in multiple policy realms as means to influence the legislative agenda, to control the allocation of resources, to appoint and dismiss thousands of different government officials, and to directly respond to the demands of their electorate. But even the most influential presidents need the political support and technical assistance of trusted advisors, technical staff, and government agencies. Students of the United States' presidency have shown that presidents have incentives for creating and strengthening technical, administrative, and advisory presidential support bodies both to confront WP 259/2014 GIGA Working Papers critical junctures -the modern US presidency emerged in the wake of the Great Depressionand to help face the challenges that are posed in a system characterized by "separated institutions sharing powers." At the same time, scholars have also documented the increasing centralization of authority around the person of the chief executive and the steady movement toward the institutional reinforcement of the political core executive as developments taking place in most advanced industrial countries in the last forty to fifty years (Peters et al. 2000) .
In Latin America the distinction between the executive leadership and the institutional nature of the modern presidency has not been addressed yet, despite there having been a significant expansion of studies on presidentialism. In this paper we begin to shed light on this underresearched topic by focusing on the presidencies of Argentina and Brazil since their redemocratization in the 1980s. Our study of the presidency concentrates on the cluster of agencies that directly support the chief of the executive, which in the presidential studies literature is called the "core executive" (Peters et al. 2000) or the "institutional presidency" (Moe 1993 (Moe , 1994 . 1 These offices are part of the bureaucracy of the executive branch, but they are not located within the executive cabinet; their defining characteristic is that they operate under the direct authority of the president and are in charge of supporting the presidential leadership (Dickinson 2005) . Following the specialized literature, we argue that the growth of the institutional presidency is connected to developments occurring in the larger political system -that is, to the governmental and political challenges that presidents face (Moe 1985; Ponder 2012) . Presidents adjust the format and mandate of the different agencies under their authority so as to better manage their relations with the wider political environment.
We observe reverse developments having taken place after the democratic transitions both in Argentina and Brazil, where the institutional presidency has at times been expanded and at other times reduced -and we thus inquire into the causes of such evolutions. These movements have not only affected the size of the institutional presidency but also the types of agency that form it. Regarding size, we borrow from Terry Moe (1985 Moe ( , 1993 Moe ( , 1994 , and call "centralization" any increase in the number of presidential agencies. For Moe, a centralizing movement indicates a shifting of the functions of the wider executive branch to the core executive instead, while, conversely, presidents "decentralize" when they take agencies away from their direct authority and place them under the authority of a cabinet minister instead.
Regarding the type of agencies, making changes to those under the presidential umbrella can affect their substantive tasks in terms of the provision of core administrative, policy, or advisory support (Inácio 2012) .
In the following pages we analyze the creation, transfer, and/or dissolution of presidential agencies, we compare how the blueprint of the institutional presi-1 In this paper we make an indistinct use of the terms "institutional presidency" and "presidential office" to refer to the group of agencies located directly under the president's authority. Later on we operationalize the term "Institutional Presidency" (IP), which we use to refer specifically to all agencies under the president's authority excluding the decentralized ones. More details on this are given in Section 3.
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We argue that the type of government -a factor that until now has not played a significant role in presidential studies, which are mostly based on the US case -poses various challenges to presidents and, thus, impacts differently on the structure of the presidency. Our empirical references, the presidencies of Brazil and Argentina, and typical cases of coalitional as well as single-party presidentialism respectively all allow us to test the impact of the aforementioned factor. In effect, we expect to find greater centralization under coalition presidentialism because presidents must share cabinet positions, negotiate, and manage relations with coalition partners. In single-party governments, meanwhile, presidents can more freely assert themselves over the whole executive structure, in other words centralization should be less necessary. Similarly, we expect the type of government to affect the types of agency that form the institutional presidency, with coalition presidents building a more complex and varied presidential institution.
The literature on presidentialism, and particularly those works focusing on coalition experiences in Latin America, sheds light on the "executive toolbox" that is available to the different heads of state for building legislative majorities (Raile, Pereira and Power 2010) . Our analysis highlights a specific tool herein that previous studies on this region have not yet explored: the strategic redesign undertaken by the president of the bureaucratic structures of the presidential office. It suggests that presidents can use the making of structural changes in their office as a tool with which to manage their relations with the wider political environment in general, and with the cabinet in particular. These changes are resources that the presidential leadership can use to complement or substitute other tools, such as agendasetting power or pork and ministerial nominations -which are those aspects usually highlighted by the aforementioned literature (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999; Amorim Neto 2000; Altman 2000; Martinez-Gallardo 2012) .
The paper is organized as follows: The next section presents the theoretical background to our study of the institutional presidency, with emphasis on the existing theories about the growth of the US presidency and with references made to the main features of the Argentine and Brazilian political systems. Following on, Section 3 deals with the research question, data, methodology, and the results obtained from our empirical study. Section 4 then concludes by outlining our pending tasks as researchers, and by suggesting what the implications of our work are for the agenda of presidential studies on Latin America henceforth.
State of the Art
There are three prominent explanations given for the emergence and growth of the institutional presidency: increased government responsibilities, the reassertion of the presidential WP 259/2014 GIGA Working Papers leadership vis-à-vis the political environment (Congress and the general public), and the more astute management of cabinet politics.
The expansion of the governance capacity of the executive to deal with major social and economic challenges is one of the classical explanations given for the growth of the US institutional presidency. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, but becoming particularly marked in the early twentieth century, the role of government both in the US and elsewhere began a steady expansion, with increased responsibilities coming therewith. This had a profound effect on the size and political role of the executive branch, giving rise to the bureaucratic state. The enlargement of the executive branch gave greater prominence and power to the president, but also brought about many problems because presidents were now expected to manage both all of their old responsibilities and new challenges as well (Mezey 2013: 99-103 A second thesis posits that the predominant explanation for the expansion of the institutional presidency is the president's need to influence policymaking. The post-Franklin D.
Roosevelt expansion is thus portrayed as an attempt to mitigate the role of Congress in the appointment, dismissal, and oversight of government officials and to reassert a strong administrative leadership (Howell 2003) . Terry Moe's take on the "politicized presidency" (1985) shows how presidents respond to limited formal authority and increased expectations of presidential power by structuring and staffing the bureaucracy in a way that makes the different agencies responsive to presidential dictate. Similarly, Rudalevige (2002) and Rudalevige and Lewis (2005) have argued that centralization under presidential authority is a presidential strategy adopted to overcome hostile congressmen and bureaucracies in order to implement new policy agendas. There have been many other works focusing on the impact of the president's political constraints on the institutional presidency. Dickinson (2000) connected the growth of the White House staff to presidential bargaining with Congress and to what occurred in the electoral arena. Krause (2002) found that changes in EOP expenditures are primarily explained by the institutional rivalry between the president and Congress. Dickinson and Lebo (2007) determined that it is primarily only the White House's staff growth that is affected by presidents' evolving political relations, while the advent of "big government" more generally is a more appropriate explanation for the growth of the EOP as a whole.
In Latin America, presidents count on a wide array of powers to improve governability.
These strong constitutional prerogatives suggest the prevalence there of the president's own preferences and leadership style in the construction of the presidential institution. They also suggest that the Latin American presidency has a great ability to adapt (Huntington 1968 ) to changes in the political environment. First, Argentine and Brazilian presidents can resort to the use of important constitutional resources to negotiate the policy agenda with Congress, such as issuing decrees with the force of law behind them as well as total or partial vetoes (Shugart and Carey 1992) . Second, while US presidents share authority with Congress over the appointment of cabinet members and other important government staff, most Latin American presidents only appoint such individuals by the signing of an ordinary decree: the organization of the executive and the appointment strategy is the presidential calculus (Amorim Neto 2006). Equally, they do not need congressional authorization to remove government officials from their job. Third, the US Congress also participates in the design and oversight of the most important executive agencies and all important social programs and government agencies require some sort of congressional approval. Although Congress must still approve major structural changes in the executive, the Latin American situation is looser.
These features make us expect ebbs and flows in the agencies comprising the presidency in these countries, rather than a process of institutionalization. However, the Argentine and Brazilian presidents also preside over a system characterized by federalism, a symmetrical bicameral system, a judiciary with review powers, and multiparty systems that impede the Thus, an important difference between Argentina and Brazil seems to be the distance between the preferences of the president and those of his cabinet. Brazilian presidents appoint ministers from different parties to comply with coalition agreements and cannot easily dismiss them without putting the coalition itself in danger. When cabinet positions are distributed to fulfil coalition agreements, the president's ministers are not his personal trusteesand he or she has incentives to grow the bureaucratic structure under their direct authority so as to coordinate and solve distributional conflicts among cabinet members. In contrast,
Argentine presidents do not normally adhere to coalition pacts and can more freely exercise their appointment and dismissal prerogatives. Certainly, the distance between preferences may still be large concerning the presidential relations with other institutions such as Congress and the bureaucracies, but it should not be so pronounced as to affect the daily functioning of the cabinet.
In short, the centralization of agencies and personnel under direct presidential authority is a typical mechanism with which presidents the world over have responded to developments occuring in the wider political system (Ponder 2012 istration" -which we, as noted, refer to as the "Institutional Presidency" (IP). In effect, for the purpose of this study we operationalize the institutional presidency (henceforth, IP) as the group of agencies directly located under the presidential authority excluding the decentralized ones.
The lines of the IP for both countries show a smaller and more compact structure at the beginning of the democratic period. Afterward, there is considerable annual variation -but as part of a more general country-specific tendency. The Argentine line moves up and down, while in Brazil there is a clear upward tendency. This happens also with the lines corresponding to the AU, which are comparatively fewer for the Brazilian presidency but also on the increase at the end of the period studied. It is clear that during the first half of the democratic period Argentine presidents tended to "centralize" agencies under their direct authority while in the last years they reversed this tendency, undertaking instead a process of decentralization. As we have seen, Moe's concept of centralization does not refer to types of agency. It just tells us whether a unit is placed under the president's authority or that of a cabinet minister.
2 To count these for Argentina we relied on information concerning the national budget. According to this approach, a unit was considered to be such when it had a budget allocation. However, we also needed to resort to secondary sources because detailed budgets have only been available since 1993. Therefore, the graph includes information obtained from other authors as well (Coutinho 2008; Bonifacio and Salas 1985) , particularly for the 1980s. For Brazil, we considered the legal provisions that distinguish the units of the presidency as direct administration (CA) and subordinated agencies, such as foundations and public companies. 
The Size of the Presidencies
In this section we are interested in the number of organizational units belonging to the institutional presidency of a given country for each year, which is our dependent variable (prunits in Table 1 ). The database contains 53 records of the number of IP units per annum:
there are 27 entries for Argentina and 26 for Brazil respectively. This database includes six Argentine presidents (Alfonsin, Menen, De la Rúa, Duhalde, and Kirchner) and four Brazilian ones (Sarney, Collor, Cardoso, and Lula). In the following, we present the independent variables that we expect to have had an impact on the size of the institutional presidency.
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These are related to the three general dimensions that were referred to in Section 2: president-cabinet relations (or type of government); president-congress relations (or the extent of political support); and, the president vis-à-vis the public's support. We also included a variable that captures institutional changes during the period studied. Our assumption about the behavior of these variables is that the number of IP units will increase -or the institutional presidency will grow -in response to the constraints of a political environment that can be a potentially challenging one for the presidential leadership. To account for the dimension of type of government, we gathered information on the composition of the government. As explained previously, we expect coalition governments -and, particularly, a high number of parties in the cabinet -to have a positive impact on the size of the institutional presidency. In other words, political fragmentation within the cabinet, and its consequent spurring of demands for coordination efforts, should encourage the creation of support units under the authority of the chief of the executive. In order to better understand the impact of the internal dynamics of the government upon the size of the presidency, we considered the number of parties in the cabinet (cabpart in Table 1 ) -based on a count of the number of coalition parties that were part of the ministerial portfolio. Interbranch conflicts are one incentive for the expansion of the institutional presidency. In the US presidency-related literature, the logic underlying this reasoning is the shared power that both branches have to authorize structural changes and appointments in the executive branch -which in the case of a divided government scenario would give more power to the congressional opposition. To be able to implement his or her policy agenda in a restrictive political environment, the president may seek to centralize agencies under their direct control -thus enlarging the size of the institutional presidency. Congressional bodies in Latin America have less power over the executive branch than the US one does, but their approval is still required for major structural changes to be made. We included a variable that addresses the political support for the government in the legislative arena. We gathered information on the proportion of legislative seats controlled by all governing parties in the lower house and built a dummy variable indicating whether the president is supported by WP 259/2014 GIGA Working Papers a majority (more than 50 percent of seats) or not (seats_dum, the last line in Table 1 ). The majority status was observed in 33.3 percent and 76.9 percent of cases in Argentina and Brazil respectively. We expect a majority status to have a negative impact on the size of the institutional presidency. 3
Besides these two main political explanatory variables, we include a set of political and economic control variables that aim to measure the power of presidents (presidential leverage) in more general terms. First we considered the president's approval rating (popularity), measured as a percentage of positive survey responses ("great" or "good") in polls about the performance of the president. The variable presents the yearly average for such positive approval ratings, and should have a negative impact on the presidency's growth: a president doing well would not need to expand their support structures. Second, as presidential resignation is not an uncommon event in our data -there were five occurrences thereof across 11 presidential terms -we thus include a dummy variable (resignation) indicating whether the president assumed their position in the wake of a previous incumbent's resignation. Caretakers will not have incentives to introduce major changes, because they will try to avoid making disruptive decisions in a context of inherited conflict. Finally, alongside the political control variables, we intended to capture the impact of economic reforms on the expansion of the institutional presidency by means of the Structural Reform Index (SRI). The SRI is an average of partial indices regarding five policies areas: privatization, financial and trade liberalization, labor regulation, and tax reforms. The closer the measure is to one, the greater the degree of general market reform occurring in that country at that time. We expect the reform variable based on the SRI to have a positive effect on the size of the institutional presidency, because of the coordination efforts that are required to lead these types of reform.
We fitted population-averaged panel data models by using generalized estimating equations (GEE) with a Poisson error and link log. Below we report the estimated relative risks (IRR), standard errors, and levels of statistical significance (Table 2 ). In the final count, we worked with 50 observations because of restricted data availability regarding the reform variable (which did not cover the years 1984, 1985, and 2010) . about the impact of the type of cabinet on the size of the presidency. The second dimension considered was president-congress relations, which was measured by the majority status of the government in the lower chamber. Holding a legislative majority decreases the size of the presidency by 17 percent, in line with our hypothesis -this effect is statistically significant (p<0.10).
Regarding the contextual variables, presidential popularity represented a negative effect -as we hypothesized. It suggests that a popular president has less incentives to invest time and resources in enlarging the presidency, and that he or she probably does not need a large structure of support backing them. Also, after a presidential resignation the successor centralizes less power and keeps a smaller IP than presidents assuming the position after regular elections do. However, the effect of both variables is not statistically significant. resources for presidential patronage and that the presidential offices may be fulfilling this patronage function instead. This is something that needs to be explored more carefully henceforth. In addition, it is interesting to note that presidents have invested in enlarging their organization in order to implement economic structural reforms. This type of reform deepens the tensions within the government because it impacts on the supporters of the cabinet's parties. Our findings suggest that coalition governments pursuing structural reforms have more incentives to centralize functions and resources within the presidency. In the next section, we explore the types of agency that presidents have brought under their authority in Argentina and Brazil since the 1980s.
The Weight of the Core Units
In the last thirty years or so the presidencies of Argentina and Brazil have changed not only in size but also in their functions. Following Inácio (2012), we classify the IP units as core, advisory, and policy ones. The units in charge of managing the daily tasks of the presidency -namely those supporting administrative, legal, and institutional tasks -constitute the center or the core of the presidency. The presidential advisory system, which is gradually integrated with new councils and consultative bodies (technical chambers), addresses policy formulation and strategic agendas. The policy units are responsible for formulating and implementing specific policies (Inácio 2012: 9) . This functional classification of the presidential units allows us to compare the physiognomy of the two presidencies studied here and to tentatively explore whether the type of government not only impacts on the size but also the type of units that presidents bring under their direct authority.
In the 1980s, the IP was basically constituted by core units in both countries (see Graph 2 below, which counts the total number of core units and the number of IP units in general).
After that decade, the number of core units in Argentina remained stable while the size of the whole IP increased up until the end of the 1990s. The structure of the institutional presidency has followed a different pathway in Brazil. The IP was essentially formed by a small number of core units in the beginning, which afterward grew together with the other types of unit that were created by the Collor and Lula governments. Therefore, the downward and upward movements in practice mean that there were substantive changes to the internal organization of the presidency. These trends involved the creation, reform, transfer, and/or dissolution of units responsible for strengthening the presidential capacities to monitor and formulate policy, as well as increases in the presidency's informational resources.
Graph 3 depicts the percentage of each type of unit out of the total of IP units for the whole time period studied, across both countries. The Argentine presidency was internally less diversified, with the units oscillating only between core and policy ones. We can see in this graph that the process of unit centralization taking place in this country in the 1990s mostly concerned policy issues. The new policy units did not necessarily cover crucial areas, but rather ones that mattered to the president: drugs, tourism, culture, science and technology, and social development. Many of them were abolished or reassigned to ministries during the following decade. The lack of advisory units is remarkable, although the core units contribute to these tasks in practice. The Brazilian picture is more diverse. The monolithic presidency of the 1980s has since been substituted by an internally differentiated and specialized institution. While the expansion of policy units has been attributed to specific junctures, 4 the creation of advisory bodies inside the presidency has in fact been a continuous process. strengthening of the core units, by means of investment in organization and personnel, has coincided with the improvement of the informational conditions available for making presidential decisions. These advisory bodies are now in charge of providing specialized subsidies in priority areas.
Regarding the core units in Argentina, they have in essence included the General Secretariat of the Presidency, the presidential unit, the legal and technical unit, the communication and press unit, and the Secretariat of Intelligence (Alessandro 2010: 25; Coutinho 2008 ) -all units with a long-standing presence within the presidency. The General Secretariat endorses all the legal decisions of the presidency, while the legal area (Legal and Technical Secretariat) provides legal advice to the president, the chief of cabinet, and to the ministers that require centralized policy formulation and implementation in new areas, such as human rights, the promotion of racial equality, and women's rights. 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 In short, the size of the institutional presidency does not reveal the whole story behind the differences between the presidencies of Argentina and Brazil. The focus on size and internal complexity does, however, provide us with a more comprehensive impression of the organizational basis underlying presidential power in these two countries. 
Brazil

Conclusion
The main purpose of this study -an assessment of the impact of the type of government on the institution of the presidency -constitutes both a hitherto unexplored area of research vis-à-vis Latin America and an interesting agenda for the presidential literature in future. Although we still need to refine some of our independent variables -such as formulating a better measurement for legislative support, and an additional one for the type of presidential agenda being pursued -our analysis provides important evidence indicating that the type of government matters for the variations in the architecture of the two presidencies of Argentina and Brazil, regarding both their size and functions.
It has been shown in the previous pages that the development of the successful Brazilian coalition presidentialism was accompanied by a compact but highly functional institutional presidency there. To confirm whether such institutional features of the presidency are a condition of success in these regimes we would need to replicate the study beyond the two cases discussed here. For this, Latin America is a rich laboratory of both successful cases, such as
Chile and Uruguay, and unsuccessful ones, such as Ecuador. However, we also need to explore in more general terms the effects of determinate forms of presidential organization on government effectiveness: in Argentina two enduring single-party governments in the 1990s and in the 2000s were accompanied by different presidential organizations and yet both were successful (as represented by a president being reelected in each case). It seems that the interaction between presidential agencies and the presidential leadership needs to be considered important as well.
One of the advantages of the study that we have proposed here is that the information on presidential agencies allows for the systematic comparative treatment of the different cases.
Other complementary studies may choose to follow, for instance, approaches based on analyses of the profile of the agents heading these agencies (their professional qualifications, political origin, and closeness to the president) as well as comparisons of the size of the presidency in terms of employees and budget. However one limit to conducting such analysis is the availability of relevant information across countries and years, a problem that we experienced while undertaking this research. A more serious additional obstacle for comparative studies is the different level of institutionalization that we find in the respective presidencies of the Latin American region. It is foreseeable that, in some cases, the important functions that we described in this paper are in the hands of individuals, and not of agencies. This problem should not, though, discourage further investigations, but rather direct the focus toward the important topic of presidential institutionalization.
